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BOOK REVIEWS 
tian has a right to make whatever commitment he pleases; and (3) 
therefore, no one has a right to criticize him for this." 
213 
Both of these strike me as much clearer examples of permissive parity arguments 
than the ones Penelhum discusses. 
Each version ofthe parity argument turns on a crucial premise about justification 
and the rationality of belief. For example, the conformist argument uses the 
pyrrhonist premise that where we lack adequate evidence, we must suspend 
judgment, or, in matters unavoidable, believe moderately, and follow the conven-
tions of our fathers. This principle, and those used in other two versions (which 
are harder to identify) need further elucidation and evaluation. I would like to 
have seen Penelhum tum his analytical skills to this task. 
Finally, Penelhum's acceptance of the permissive parity argument is a major 
concession to the fideism which I take it he rejects. If his characterization of 
fideism as the view that faith needs no support from reason is his considered 
view, and if he accepts this argument with its conclusion that it is rationally 
permissible to hold religious beliefs without basing them on evidence, then it 
would seem that Penelhum is condoning a fideist position, contrary to his inten-
tions. 
From Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again: A Journey in Final Causality, Species, 
and Evolution, by Etienne Gilson. Trans. John Lyon, Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1984. Pp. 209. $22.95. 
PHILLIP R. SLOAN, University of Notre Dame. 
The questions dealt with by the book-natural teleology, evolutionary biology, 
and metaphysics-are crucial issues in any philosophical reflection on biology, 
particular those undertaken in a religious context, and I was interested to see 
the contribution of Gilson's deep historical and philosophical insights to these 
questions. Initially I should note that the history and philosophy of the life 
sciences is no stranger to Gilson, although it has been many years since he last 
dealt with such problems. Among his many titles is his Descartes, Harvey et la 
Scolastique,l a work still worth careful study by Harvey and Descartes scholars. 
His reading of the primary sources of Buffon, Bonnet, Linnaeus, Lamarck, 
Cuvier, Darwin, and Spencer is interesting if for no other reason than that it 
turns Gilson's erudition onto this group of the founders of modem biology. His 
discussion of more recent biological theory and theorists-Walter Elsasser, Jac-
ques Monad, and Georges Canguilhem-does not avoid all the pitfalls awaiting 
the non-specialist in these areas, but it shows a refreshing intellectual toughness 
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and clarity which have always been Gilson's identifying characteristics. 
The main issues addressed by this set of essays center around an examination 
of natural teleology, and the viability of this concept in the face of the challenges 
posed by modem biology. Teleological purposiveness, and particularly the claims 
of a non-relative finalism of organic life, is not a popular concept in modem 
biology. The standard view among many theorists of biology would seem more 
to he that the development of modem biology has effectively destroyed the 
concept, not only in its Platonic-Stoic physicotheological interpretation, which 
affirms an external rationality or "N ature" designing organisms to pre-determined 
ends, but also in its immanent Aristotelian form. 2 
Gilson's undertaking is to examine the relation of teleology and biology in 
light of what he interprets to be the mechanistic challenge. The larger importance 
of this issue is transparent. The degree to which one can make some kind of 
appeal to an inherent natural teleology as grounding for a natural-law ethic, or 
to the organic world as showing some evidence of divine creation, would seem 
to depend at some point on the viability of some kind of teleological interpretation 
of life. As a Neo-Thomist, Gilson is predictably a realist about natural teleology. 
The deeper question is whether such a position can really be sustained in the 
wake of modem advances in the understanding of biology. 
Gilson deals with this issue in a series of loosely connected essays. Opening 
with a discussion of Aristotle's notion of biological teleology, Gilson has followed 
this onto a discussion of the classic confrontation between "mechanistic" and 
"teIcogical" perspectives in the discussions of the Greek nature philosophers. 
This is succeeded by a chapter on Darwinian evolution and finality. Discussions 
of Bergson's views on teleology and an analysis of the modem confrontation 
between mechanistic reductionism and finalism close the book. Somewhat curi-
ously placed, two appendices are given, one simply reproducing Linnaeus' first 
edition of the Systema naturae of 1735, and the second a discussion of Darwin's 
concept of organic species. I felt the latter belonged in the text proper. 
As a general comment on the work, it cannot be considered to be an exhaustive 
analysis of any of the topics with which it deals. Certain problems of organization 
also render its treatment of the issues episodic rather than a smoothly integrated 
study. This is regrettable, because I found the book wandering too much from 
the central issues, and in the end I was wishing for more substance. Nevertheless, 
I found it useful for raising several central problems in a way that is rarely 
available in English literature. 
The opening discussion of Aristotle's notion of organic teleology was brief, 
but pithy, and it served to clarify some important points concerning Aristotle's 
position on these questions. Gilson emphasizes that Aristotle's conception of 
natural teleology is neither properly assimilated under "vitalism," which Gilson 
views as a Platonic notion, nor is it deeply committed to the causal efficacy of 
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metaphysical entities, such as soul, which historically have formed components 
of Aristotle's biology. Gilson also clarifies, I feel, some of the complexities in 
Aristotle's positions. It is not clear that Aristotle himself was committed to a 
general teleology of "Nature" as distinct from the individualized finalism of 
specific instantiated "natures," at least if by "Nature" is meant some kind of 
Platonic Demiurge or World-soul. 3 This is an important point, and it was one 
that could have sustained an extended discussion, since much of the confusion 
surrounding teleology and biology depend on the substitution of Platonic-Stoic 
meanings for those properly seen as Aristotelian. Gilson also clarifies, I feel, 
the point that Aristotle's final cause is not dependent on the notion that the future 
acts as a causal agency on the present to bring about its own realization-that 
is, a cause to be conceived as acting in the same way as material and efficient 
causes. It is more an empirically-given aspect of nature, a spontaneous activity, 
which is recognized in all our natural intuitions of the organization and subordi-
nation of heterogeneous parts to one another in organic beings (p. 7). Aristotelian 
teleology does not, on his analysis, involve a "conscious" intentionality on the 
part of organisms other than man, and it is not based on a naive anthropomorphism 
attributing to "Nature" the conscious artistry of human design. Nature for this 
reason does not imitate art. Rather, art is a conscious and learned analogue of 
the processes accomplished naturally in organisms without foresight and planning. 
The fertilized ovum becomes the adult chicken spontaneously, but directionally, 
through a series of identifiable stages which man, through his reflection, can 
imitate by positing rational ends for realization in the future (p. 11). 
This does seem, if I read Gilson correctly, to imply that the Aristotelian is 
not committed to the view that one can simply read off, in an unproblematic 
way, the teleological purposes of natural things. The purposiveness of nature is 
grasped by analogy, and the intuitive experience of teleology is not necessarily 
even fully articulatable: 
The analogy with art, then, assists us to recognize the presence in nature 
of a cause analogous to that which is intelligence in the operations of 
man, but we do not know what this cause is. The notion of a teleology 
without consciousness and immanent in nature remains mysterious to 
us. Aristotle does not think that this should be a reason to deny its 
existence. Mysterious or not, the fact is there. It is not incomprehensible 
because of its complexity, which we can only hope science will one 
day clarify, but because of its very nature, which does not allow it to 
be expressed in a formula. (p. 10) 
Locating the issue of teleology at the level of an empirical intuition rather 
than at that of a causal explanation is clarifying, and it serves to eliminate many 
of the standard objections to the validity of the concept. The classic "mechanistic" 
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objection has centered on the issue of the fruitlessness of teleogical explanations, 
and the history of the biomedical sciences since Harvey would seem to support 
the claim that the elimination of Greek teleological accounts of organic process 
was critical for the growth of modem biology. But the claim that teleological 
purposiveness forms an overarching, immediate intuition of the organic realm 
which cannot be eliminated by any analytic dissection of organisms into their 
component physico-chemical mechanisms, locates the issue at a different point. 
Gilson in fact seems to prefer the sharp separation of scientific from metaphysical 
is:mes here, acknowledging that science has little to say, for or against, the 
concept of teleology as he interprets the question. The issue lies at the level of 
the underlying foundations of natural philosophy (pp. 16,31). 
This is all eminently sensible, I feel, but one is left with a difficulty. Simply 
removing the issue from the domain of science does not itself warrant the interpre-
tations Gilson gives of the problem. Several philosophers have acknowledged 
Gilson's point about the necessity of a teleological perspective on organisms 
without accepting his conclusions, and Fr. Jaki seems correct in his preface in 
seeing the issue to be that of scientific Realism, which is ultimately to be grounded 
on the theological doctrine of creation. Without this as premise in the argument, 
it is difficult to see that the recognition of natural purposiveness implies the truth 
of a general teleological perspective. I couldn't help but feel that the author 
Gilson really needed to do more with in this discussion was not Bergson, but 
Kant and his detailed discussions of exactly these issues in the Critique of 
Judgment. Kant also endorses many of the points Gilson has recognized, and 
similarly denies the adequacy of a fully mechanistic biology, but with one 
important difference-the teleological judgement, while in fact necessary for the 
study of biology, is nevertheless not constitutive of it, and it leaves one with 
the notion of a regulative principle which is gradually eliminable by the success 
of mechanistic science. The importance of Kant's interpretation of the problem 
for the success of modem biology has only begun to be explored. 41t raises issues 
that those defending Gilson's teleological realism, and I would consider myself 
one of these, need to deal with more directly. 
Too little account is taken of a second set of issues. Granting a realist interpre-
tation of teleological purposiveness, one still must distinguish the admission of 
immediate purposiveness of organic function and structure from the conclusion 
of a non-relative finalism of life in general. This is the point at issue in the 
preference among many biological theorists for the concept of "teleonomy," 
which is an attempt to recognize both the purposive character of organisms, 
without a commitment to a more general teleology of nature. S Rather than seeing 
this simply as linguistic trickery, as Stanley J aki interprets it, there is a substantial 
issue here. One can surely acknowledge the functional subordination of parts, 
the close relation of form and function to conditions of life, and even the fact 
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that organisms clearly carry out goal-seeking activities, without implying a larger 
teleology of life sufficient for theological and ethical concerns. 6 This is, as I 
understand it, the real issue facing Gilson and those endorsing his position. 
Gilson's approach to the question of teleology is, in my view, a generally good 
one. It must remain for others to deepen these arguments sufficiently. 
I was particularly interested to see the application Gilson made of these argu-
ments in his treatment of evolutionary biology. The title of the book will undoubt-
ably draw a readership from those hoping to find a Thomistic-Aristotelian solution 
to the issues raised by evolutionary biology, and those aware of the evolutionary 
literature are familiar with the fact that it is the anti-teleological implications of 
natural selection which are repeatedly summoned to deny theistic interpretations 
of evolution. Here I was somewhat disappointed, not so much by what Gilson 
concluded, but by the approach he took. For a small book, too much space was 
devoted to belabouring a well-known issue-the fact that Darwin never explicitly, 
except on one occasion, used the term 'evolution' to characterize his theory. 
Gilson's larger point is more interesting, and is one I would have liked to see 
him develop more fully-namely that there is a distinction to be made between 
the scientific theory formulated by Darwin to explain the variety of geological, 
paleontological, anatomical and biogeographical facts at his disposal, and 
evolutionary natural philosophies, particularly as formulated by Herbert Spencer 
and Henri Bergson. The latter theories comprise, on Gilson's view, modem 
"evolutionism," and Darwin's position vis-a-vis these claims is viewed as ambigu-
ous. Gilson is correct, I feel, in seeing Darwin's interests as primarily those of 
a natural scientist, rather than being those of a natural philosopher, at least to 
the extent that he typically subsumed metaphysical and theological questions to 
those more properly scientific and empirical. Gilson was also refreshingly candid 
in admitting that the empirical issues being discussed by Darwin are often tech-
nical and not easily accessible to the lay reader. 
While I found Gilson's discussions of Darwinism and evolutionary theory 
judicious and fair, I could not agree with his assessment on several points. 
Gilson's awareness of the Darwinian archive, beyond the published Origin and 
Descent of Man, is slight, and there is insufficient grasp of the complex issues 
which formed the context in which Darwin's theory emerged. He also relies too 
heavily on the claims of certain authors (Paul Lemoine) to represent an alleged 
scientific consensus on the deficiencies of evolutionary theory. 7 The numerous 
reassessments of Darwin and evolutionary biology made in 1982 centennial 
commemorations, while surely not revealing a seamless cloth of scholarly opin-
ion, would hardly support such a view. 8 
Gilson's analysis of the issues posed by evolutionary biology are not detailed, 
and to the degree that they can be characterized, his points would generally fall 
in the category of what I would term "Cuvierian" arguments, meaning that they 
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repeat in general substance the arguments made by the French naturalist Georges 
Cuvier (1769-1832) against early versions of transformism. This is not surprising, 
since Cuvier also was deeply influenced by the analysis of form, function and 
teleological purposiveness developed by Aristotle, particularly in such works as 
the De Partibus animalium, and from these foundations Cuvier drew what for 
a time were seen as devastating critiques of the possibility of genuine trans for-
mism. 9 
Space will not permit a full analysis of the Cuvierian critique, and the responses 
to it. It is one which appears in sophisticated versions of "creation science," and 
it raises points that do need to be taken more fully into account by theorists of 
biology. However, it typically succeeds as a critique of Darwinian evolution 
only by a failure to take into sufficient account Darwin's actual arguments. 
It is important to see more generally what is at issue in this critique. First 
there is the claim that because organisms are organized and harmonious wholes, 
rather than Empedoclean assemblages of dissociated parts, evolution becomes 
implausible because it seems to imply an accidental assemblage of parts in which 
the survival of the resultant forms becomes unimaginable. Gilson thus objects 
that "observable plants and animals can only subsist thanks to the accord of the 
part:, of which they are composed." (p. 83). Those aware of the historical context 
in which evolutionary theory appeared in its Darwinian version, recognize that 
the standard objections against it entrenched in the reigning scientific opinion 
were all broadly Cuvierian, and Darwin realized that his theory needed to meet 
these kinds of objections to convince his critical audience of scientific peers. 
The working of Darwinian theory by evolutionary gradualism, slight variation, 
great expanses of time, and its use of precisely the same intimate coordinate 
relationships of form and function affirmed by Cuvier, were decisive factors in 
disaIming scientific objections on these grounds to his theory. I will not seek to 
examine the problems which might be raised with these premises of Darwinian 
evolution here. It is important to be aware that Gilson raises no new lines of 
objection, nor are his objections ones which were not considered by Darwin 
himself in some detail. Once this is recognized, it is less easy to see these kinds 
of critiques as really decisive. Darwin was, it must be remembered, eventually 
able to convince even the most sceptical and knowledgeable members of the 
scientific community of his day, naturalists such as Lyell and Owen, of the 
plam.ibility of his theoretical account, at least in its main features. 
Gilson's second broad line of objection is also "Cuvierian" in that he bases 
it, as Cuvier had, on a strongly "positivist" interpretation of science, meaning 
by this that science is conceived to be an inquiry concerned with necessary 
demonstration from strictly empirical premises (pp. 89, 93, 109, 149). Such 
criticisms need to be questioned. Gilson's conception of science in fact seems 
to exclude all hypotheses and theoretical leaps, all appeals to unobservable 
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entities, from scientific reasoning. 10 Of course, when science is interpreted in 
this way, evolutionary biology is indeed not "science." But this view of science 
reduces it at some point to a hypothesis-free summary of data and an exercise 
in deductive logic, and at least to this extent evolutionary theory is in nor more 
difficulty than all of modern science, since nothing since Descartes' failed attempt 
to construct a totally demonstrative physics from true and certain premises seems 
to be able to satisfy Gilson's criteria. It is one thing to claim that Darwinian 
theory violates the empirical data, something which is yet to be shown conclu-
sively, and another to claim that it goes beyond the given data by positing 
connections and relationships among the empirical data which are admittedly 
hypothetical and dependent on hypothesis and speculative leaps. It has been all 
too easy for critics of evolutionary biology to move from awareness of the latter 
to assertions of the former, and Gilson does not escape this fallacy. 
On the whole, I was also disappointed with the degree to which Gilson dealt 
with the question of evolution and natural teleology in this book. He points out 
important issues that surely need to be reflected upon-for example that Darwin 
implied some belief in an inherent teleological purposiveness to "Nature" in 
many statements of the Origin. Gilson also sees that this could not be merely 
metaphor and accidental locution, since the validity of Darwin's appeal at many 
points to the analogy between artificial and natural selection depends on the 
force of this intentional analogy. However, Gilson is unaware of the complex 
layerings of the development of Darwin's argument from the Notebooks onward, 
in which Darwin moved increasingly toward a non-teleological interpretation of 
natural selection. II This represents more than confusion on Darwin's part, because 
the admission of a relative finality of organisms, and a close subordination of 
form, function and activity to external conditions of life can be rendered intellig-
ible without necessarily implying a larger purposiveness to organic life. Admit-
tedly this development creates problems for Darwin's use of the artificial-natural 
selection analogy. But Darwin's move toward the "survival of the fittest" interpre-
tation of natural selection leaves open the possibility of a purely relative finalism 
of life. Dinosaurs can be judged as "adapted" to a given set of environmental 
conditions, meaning by this that they can be asserted to have de Jacto possessed 
the necessary structures and functions for life under those conditions, and 
nevertheless became extinct as those conditions apparently altered. 
It is surely as possible to interpret this in the non-teleological sense of Hume's 
"prolific Mother creating beings to no end" as it is to see in it a larger teleological 
purposiveness. Darwin's mature views increasingly tended to Hume' s position, 
and critiques of natural teleology by evolutionary biologists do likewise. This 
is surely not to say that such arguments are unanswerable. I do not feel they 
bear in the way often asserted on the question of divine creation. But it does 
mean that sufficient treatment of these questions needs to consider a broader set 
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of issues and texts than is done in this book. The greatest danger would be to 
consider Gilson's discussions as more than question-posing reflections, a pro-
legomena to a deeper discussion that hopefully someone will choose to undertake. 
As a final comment, I found the text well-prepared, the translation clear in 
most parts, and the notes useful. John Lyon has done an admirable job of locating 
English editions and page references for Gilson's citations, and has pointed out 
some nagging errors in citations of sources in Gilson's text. 
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